Kantian moral religion is supposed to flow from two premises: (1) the highest good, a world in which all are virtuous and happy, is a necessary object of the will, and (2) God and immortality are jointly necessary for the possibility of the highest good. In this article, I argue that premise (1) is subject to an objection that scuppers Kantian moral religion at its base. More specifically, I show that the traditional grounds for the necessary possibility of the highest good are incoherent, and that alternate grounds that have been suggested either do not serve Kant’s purposes, or are philosophically and/or exegetically bankrupt.
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